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ABSTRACT
This article draws on ethnographic research in Tanzania to interrogate 
the discourse of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in sub-Saharan irrigation 
development. It contrasts the complexity of social and political 
relations with narratives suggesting that ‘private’ is necessarily 
opposed and superior to ‘public’. We argue that support for models 
of private-sector development obscures access to and control over 
resources and can result in the dispossession of those least able 
to resist this. Different interests of ‘entrepreneurial’ individuals and 
corporate investors and the ways in which these relate to the state 
are also glossed over. Conversely, the failure of the ‘public’ cannot 
simply be read from the chequered histories of irrigation schemes 
within which public and private interests intersect in complex ways.
Introduction
A current renewal of interest in irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) combines support for 
‘public–private partnerships’ (PPPs) with an increased attention to the activities of small-scale 
private irrigators, often characterised as ‘entrepreneurs’.1 At the same time, the ‘public’ is fre-
quently seen as failing. Discussion of the future of irrigation contrasts state-supported schemes 
with a history of apparent failure and the promise of both partnerships between private capital 
and the state and the innovations of individual entrepreneurs. For example, a recent study 
asks: ‘Given the poor performance of public investments, whether in state or farmer-managed 
systems, one might ask whether the job of developing and operating irrigation systems is 
best left to the private sector’.2 The idea of a new ‘global irrigation compact’ in which aid finance 
should no longer be channelled via government agencies has also been suggested3
In this paper, we examine how the public and private are differently constructed in relation 
to irrigation development, contrasting prevailing discourses with the complexity of social 
and political relations, empirically illustrated with ethnographic research in Tanzania.4  We 
argue that the effects of current discourse are important: specifically, support to particular 
models of private-sector development that both obscures access to and control over 
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2   E. HARRISON AND A. MDEE
resources, especially land and water, and can also result in dispossession of those least able 
to resist this. In the process, the differing interests of many types of ‘entrepreneurial’ individ-
uals and corporate investors (and the ways in which these relate to the state) are obscured. 
Conversely, we suggest that the failure of the ‘public’ cannot simply be read from the cheq-
uered histories of irrigation schemes within which public and private interests have inter-
sected in complex ways. Such ‘public’ schemes have been a dominant mode of irrigation 
development over many decades, have widely been characterised as failures, and are seeing 
a recent revival.
The distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ is one of several ‘great dichotomies’ of 
Western thought: a binary that subsumes a range of distinctions and renders the complex 
apparently simpler and more understandable.5 When it comes to natural resource manage-
ment, Sikor et al. have argued that this is a false dichotomy and that a range of institutions 
has emerged that can be characterised as public–private hybrids which ‘are simultaneously 
public and private – or, to complicate matters are neither public nor private’.6 In this paper, 
we build on this to show just how significant such usages can be – and why it matters. This 
is because, while neither public nor private is simply descriptive and both are always rooted 
in ideology, the bases for their attribution can have important implications, both for access 
to and control over resources, and for the power that shapes this. Specifically, assumptions 
about the ‘public’ and ‘private’ shape strategic policy and investment decisions concerning 
the types of PPPs that are seen as possible. This is currently reflected in discussions of the 
‘nexus’ of water, food and energy, and the role of policy within this.7
An extensive literature examines how the development of policy and its implementation 
is not a neutral, value-free process.8 Instead, it reflects the location of key actors in varying 
positions of power whose narratives come to shape what is seen as appropriate and legiti-
mate. However, these are not ‘free floating’; they reflect ‘discourse coalitions’ and networks.9 
Such coalitions give coherence and acceptability to specific narratives and point to the both 
visible and hidden power of different institutional configurations.10 In order to appreciate 
how this takes place, qualitative research that critically analyses how different positions are 
articulated – and by whom – is important. For irrigation, such insights have informed critical 
academic analysis by a variety of authors.11 However, they remain remarkably absent from 
the discourses and approaches of the mainstream institutions that promote irrigation – both 
donors and national governments.
The next section of this paper examines the linkages between irrigation in SSA and an 
emphasis on the dynamic power of the private sector. We first outline the ways in which a 
‘New Green Revolution’  in SSA has been linked to irrigation, arguing that there has always 
been flexibility in how public and private distinctions are articulated within this. We contrast 
this with an apparent failure of ‘public’ irrigation, manifested as state support to irrigation 
schemes. As we note, this has taken place in the context of a much broader ideological shift 
towards the private sector and against the state in international discourse and policy.
We then turn to our evidence from Tanzania in order to explore this in more detail. 
Tanzania is a good example of a country considered to have considerable ‘latent’ potential 
for irrigated agricultural production, but that has continually struggled to realise this poten-
tial.12 Its agricultural past is one of contestation over the role of the state and the public 
sector, especially over the issue of access to land.13  In addition, a history of colonial and 
post-colonial donor-supported state irrigation schemes resulted largely in failure.14 National 
agricultural and irrigation strategy now emphasises the necessity of large-scale private 
investment, while formal policy foregrounds the desirability of PPP. As we shall explore, this 
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emphasis obscures the diversity of public–private relationships that already exist in irrigation 
practice in Tanzania, and the ways in which these build on a history of complex relationships 
between the public and the private.
We conclude by stressing not only the ideological nature of attributions of public and 
private, but also how these reflect broader issues of resource control and politics at different 
levels and scales. We argue that emphasis on the ‘private’ can end up obscuring the different 
ways in which both individuals and groups, whether small-scale entrepreneurs or large 
corporations, gain control over water. It may also divert attention from the fact that much 
‘private’ development is still effectively reliant on the state through the subsidies provided 
via the aid system.
Celebrating the private: the ‘New Green Revolution’ and entrepreneurial 
innovators
Agricultural growth in SSA is very much on the policy agenda. Indeed, there is a prevailing 
view that there is a vast untapped potential that can be harnessed with a combination of 
the right technologies and the right institutions.15 An important element of this is an 
increased role for the private sector. Saghir, outlining World Bank efforts in relation to agri-
cultural growth in SSA, argues that there is an abundance of labour, land and untapped 
water, sufficient for a ‘massive expansion of agricultural production’.16 This expansion will be 
driven by the development of ‘modern technologies’, facilitated by a climate of increased 
private-sector interest in expanding irrigation, more donor commitment, and an improved 
national policy environment. Initiatives such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) call for a new African Green Revolution with irrigation 
development at its centre. Otsuka and Larson similarly suggest that there is considerable 
scope for transferring the lessons of the Asian Green Revolution to SSA.17 There have been 
critiques. For example, Patel has recently argued that these calls for a ‘New Green Revolution’ 
obfuscate the dynamics of the ‘first’ Green Revolution. Drawing on theorists of class formation 
and its intersection with knowledge production, he suggests that in the first Green Revolution, 
the more negative features, such as impoverishment and increased inequality, are occluded, 
ignored and distorted.18 However, such critical voices have not substantially influenced the 
overall direction of policy.
Saghir suggests that the expansion of irrigation will cost some US dollars 40 billion  of 
which one-quarter will come from the World Bank, and the rest from government and pub-
lic–private investment arrangements. According to Trier of the World Bank, PPP arrangements 
require substantial investments in infrastructure and technology and investors need assur-
ance of the limitation of risk to their capital in making these investments. He further argues: 
‘PPP promotion and development in the irrigation subsector are challenging compared to 
other sectors as there is oftentimes stronger sociopolitical resistance because of the 
socio-economics of rural areas and the feeling of public ownership of water services’.19 Such 
resistance has been noted in various contexts. For example, Trawick points out that the World 
Bank’s favouring of privatisation of water has met with strong protest throughout the 
Andes.20 However, this is generally perceived as a barrier to be overcome, rather than a flaw 
in the approach itself.
The involvement of large companies in the management of irrigation, especially through 
schemes that bring together the public and the private through ‘out-grower’ models, is one 
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important element of the New Green Revolution.21 This has included an argument that there 
is a need to ‘secure’ property rights, including to water. Thus, the discourse suggests that 
insecure property rights are an impediment to modernisation, as well as rendering small-
holders vulnerable to expropriation. As a recent World Bank-supported study put it: ‘even 
half a century after independence, only 10 per cent of rural land in SSA is registered; the rest 
is undocumented and thus vulnerable to land grabbing and expropriation without 
compensation’.22
The response to this lack of registration is processes of formalisation that may in fact 
weaken many farmers’ claims to water and land,23 and an extensive literature has emerged 
to critique such arrangements.24 The commercialisation of water is seen as part of a broader 
process of ‘land grabs’, involving extensive investments by the private sector (often multi-
national companies) in land that is variously described as ‘public’, ‘state owned’ or ‘customary’. 
The labelling of the acquisition of large areas of land in SSA as ‘land grabs’ may obscure the 
diversity of such deals in terms of the nature of the investor, and the scale and form of 
investment.25 However, there is a clear shift towards increased corporate control. Importantly, 
‘securing’ land is also seen by donors as crucial for small-scale farmers. But here, the meaning 
and effects of the ‘securing’ of land are different to those of corporate acquisitions, though 
equally potentially problematic for those less able to influence the process.26 The difference 
between the two contexts is nonetheless obscured by an overarching focus on the inherent 
merits of the ‘private’ when it comes to property.
In addition to PPPs in which the ‘private sector’ is seen as equivalent to large, often foreign, 
companies, the ‘private’ is also seen as epitomised by a very different set of actors: independ-
ent, entrepreneurial farmers. There is a mounting interest in the potential of ‘small, private’ 
irrigation entrepreneurs to contribute to improved livelihoods and poverty alleviation. This 
analysis frames small-scale irrigating farmers as latent entrepreneurs.27 Here, the private is 
so in the sense that it reflects the interests and activities of individuals and households that 
are in some sense beyond and outside the purview of the state. They are ‘entrepreneurs’ in 
the ways in which they embrace markets and the search for profit, often in ways that are 
seen as innovatory and spontaneous. They show an ability to do so without much support, 
using their own resources, and are often ignored by planners and policymakers.28 As de 
Fraiture and Giordano put it: ‘Simple design, relatively low cost, easy application and high 
profitability render small private irrigation an alternative to public schemes and an attractive 
option for smallholders’.29 
There are, however, concerns about such entrepreneurialism. Some suggest that the 
individualisation of irrigation and its unchecked spread pose challenges for the management 
of water resources, for example because too much water is abstracted and insufficient atten-
tion is paid to the relationship between upstream and downstream users. In addition, there 
may be adverse effects on access to and control over resources as those with weaker access 
to land and water are excluded in the course of the ‘scramble for irrigation’.30 Conflicts also 
emerge between different users, for example when irrigation practices exclude livestock 
owners from access to water sources for their animals. Together these concerns can lead 
both to calls for the greater formalisation of the irrigators’ organisation, and to discussion 
of the need for regulation – usually by the state/public sector.
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Public failures and the need for reform
At the same time as the ‘private sector’ has been portrayed as an important vehicle for a New 
Green Revolution, including for irrigation, the ‘public’, equated with ‘the state’, is seen as 
simultaneously problematic and yet still also a key player. This position was initially part of 
the much wider ideological onslaught on the state from the 1980s onwards. It has become 
more nuanced during the twenty-first century as the complexity behind the simple equation 
of the state with the public becomes evident. However, a broadly neoliberal distrust of the 
state as corrupt, inefficient and wasteful remains strong.
There are certainly many well-documented public sector failures. State-supported irriga-
tion has, over many decades and dating back to colonial times, taken place in ‘schemes’ and 
it has been widely accepted that many have not survived because of a combination of 
institutional and governance factors. ‘Failure’ has meant abandonment of schemes, but also 
the suggestion that their latent potential has not been met.31 State-run irrigation schemes 
have also been seen as fairly homogeneous communities, despite mounting evidence of 
processes of social stratification in some schemes.32
Problems in government-run schemes contributed to policy that encouraged the dimi-
nution of the public in favour of a greater role for private actors, including support to farm-
er-led organisations such as water users’ associations (WUAs). Governments in SSA have 
followed these donor-influenced policy positions, although frequently accompanied by 
resistance from within state bureaucracies.33 In recent years, discussion of irrigation reform 
has therefore focused on the reasons for such resistance, while also engaging with wider 
concerns about the nature of African governance and apparent failures of the public sector 
to ‘deliver’ on expectations. In this, old schemes are being re-launched and revitalised, but 
now in ways that bring in private capital via the PPPs discussed above.
The widespread emphasis on PPP models, however, suggests that the nature of public 
involvement in irrigation remains critical. The public sector is seen as shaping the facilitating 
environment for the nature of private investment in irrigation; it is also seen as having a role 
in bearing some of the risk for such investments. Just as we have emphasised that private 
interests in irrigation are diverse and exist at multiple scales, the relationships that can be 
established with the public sector are also multiple. The nature of government bureaucracy 
and decision-making, the extent of decentralisation and resource raising powers will all have 
implications for the nature of PPPs. Equally, those within government may operate as private 
individuals when it comes to gaining access to resources. Here, the question of whether and 
how key players are operating as public or private actors becomes particularly pertinent.
In the next section, we turn to our empirical examples to explore the themes discussed 
above, contrasting a formal, and externally supported, irrigation scheme with farmers whose 
irrigation practices were construed as private and informal.34 We then reflect on how these 
sit within broader considerations of the relationship between the public and private in irri-
gation development in Tanzanian national discourse. The research on which this discussion 
is based involved ethnographic fieldwork and included participant observation, informal 
interviews and focus groups. This was supplemented by a quantitative survey of 200 inform-
ants. Interviews were also carried out with individuals representing government, interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors at both local and national levels. 
In Tanzania, 20 such interviews were conducted. The researchers also took part in a workshop 
with the National Irrigation Commission in Dar-es-Salaam in September 2016.
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Reinventing public failure through co-operative private enterprise
There is a tendency across SSA for former state farms to be born again with new donor 
investment. The Dakawa rice farm near Morogoro is a good example of this. Once a failed 
state-run farm, originally built with North Korean assistance, the 2000-hectare scheme is 
now portrayed by its donor, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
as a ‘success’. This is partly because of the technical rehabilitation, but also because it is run 
by a co-operative of almost 1000 small-scale farmers. However, our research suggests that 
Dakawa is less a collective enterprise than a series of private enterprises. Here, the relation-
ship between public and private is not straightforward, and is used strategically by some 
individuals to consolidate their access to land while employing labourers. This is in turn 
partially linked to the access of these individuals to the formal structures of the state.
As we elaborate elsewhere,35 Dakawa has had a complex history. Since its official bank-
ruptcy in 1995, there have been various attempts to use the asset and there is evidence of 
local political conflicts to take control of the scheme. Reportedly, powerful and wealthy 
individuals in the Morogoro Region entered into an alliance with the local Village Council 
to gain access to it. Our interviews suggest that the scheme did not function in the interests 
of all users at that time. As we were told by one farmer: ‘people could ring up from Dar and 
order that their plots are watered first’. Here, private interests are apparently met through 
association with the state at its lowest level.
Meanwhile, there is still a significant formal role for the state. One of the major users of 
the Dakawa Rice Farm is the government-run Chollima Rice Institute, which in turn influenced 
the creation of UWAWAKUDA, the farmers’ collective organisation. The Chairman of the 
scheme is a government employee and agronomist from the Chollima Rice Institute. 
UWAWAKUDA is nominally a cooperative society of ‘small-scale’ farmers with nearly 1000 
members, each of whom was only permitted to farm a five-hectare block of land. However, 
many blocks were farmed collectively, with members within them farming smaller areas. 
Each of these farmers was also an ‘investor’ in the scheme as membership is accessed through 
the purchase of shares. Nonetheless, our interviews suggest that actual control of the scheme 
does not necessarily lie with the collective, but with larger scale farmers who maintain control 
over large blocks of land through a practice of registering several blocks in the names of 
others. One USAID contractor suggested that ‘most farmers here are just labourers on other 
people’s land’.
Whilst we might consider all the farmers in Dakawa who hold shares to be ‘private inves-
tors’, they are not a homogeneous group. The village government of Dakawa also has an 
interest in the scheme, with some individual farmers being members of the Village Council. 
In this case, then, public interests can also be private and it is difficult to differentiate between 
the two. Dakawa is perhaps most accurately seen as a type of PPP but one in which the public 
interests are the local state institutions (Village Council and Chollima Rice Institute) and the 
private is a range of farmer-investors (at many scales). Meanwhile, these farmer-investors 
are a highly differentiated group. They range from those who farm a fraction of a five-hectare 
block to larger scale commercial farmers who are effectively absentee landlords.
Aid also provides a subsidy to Dakawa and it is not clear that the scheme would be able 
to function without it36 This results in a complex public–private hybrid with critical invest-
ment from outside which demonstrates a reliance on the public in various ways. A long list 
of bilateral donors has invested in the Dakawa rice farm since its foundation, starting with 
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North Korea and later including Japan, Australia and Denmark. Current USAID support to 
Dakawa under the Feed the Future programme has focused on increasing the productivity 
of rice cultivation, and farmers report production as having doubled or tripled in the course 
of the project. However, declining rice prices in 2014 left farmers no better off than in pre-
vious years.37 The high cost of electricity to run the pumps for the scheme is also critical; 
accounts suggest that the contributions of members do not cover these costs and that 
therefore there is doubt about the sustainability of the scheme in the longer term.
Contested interests: private entrepreneurs versus ‘the public’
Our second example illustrates how private small-scale irrigation can seem opposed to con-
ceptions of the public interest. Choma, in the Ulurguru mountains, is a small settlement on 
the slopes above the city of Morogoro. The matrilineal Luguru people have lived in these 
mountains since the seventeenth century.38 Although this is an area with a long-standing 
history of irrigation, the ways in which this takes place and the intensity of cultivation have 
changed dramatically in recent years. Previously, hand-dug furrows were used to move water 
from the mountain stream to land at the edges of these streams. However, over the last 
decade the gradual adoption of relatively cheap hosepipes has enabled the use of gravity-fed 
sprinklers and resulted in the expansion of both the area under irrigation and the number 
of people involved. Very small-scale farmers are successfully cultivating vegetables and fruit 
(particularly strawberries) for the local urban markets and reaping significant rewards in 
terms of their ability to upgrade housing, invest in education and purchase capital goods 
such as motorbikes. They are not formally organised, but to date have successfully managed 
access to land and water, with few local conflicts.
The Choma farmers upgraded and improved their irrigation practice without external 
assistance. The availability of hosepipes has been critical to this but the change was driven 
through local farmer-led innovation. These farmers are clearly investing, albeit on a small 
scale. However, this example of successful and entrepreneurial irrigation development is 
not seen as such by those responsible for governing water supply for the nearby downstream 
city of Morogoro, the urban municipality and the river basin office. Rather, they are portrayed 
as being in direct conflict with broader ‘public interest’. The Uluguru Mountains are the source 
of water for both Morogoro and Dar-es-Salaam, and the authorities in Morogoro portray the 
irrigation practices of the farmers who live there as environmentally destructive and the 
source of current urban water supply problems. Narratives of destruction combine accounts 
of farmers degrading their environment over many years with more recent concerns about 
increased water abstraction because of the growth of sprinkler irrigation.39 In contrast, farm-
ers suggest that they are acting sustainability and merely providing incomes for their families, 
while the source of water shortages in the town is the growth of building on the lower slopes 
of the mountains.
But this is about more than narratives. On the one hand, there are pressures to formalise 
the farmers into a WUA, to be better able to regulate their activity (and tax their extraction). 
More significantly, there have been attempts by the municipality, resisted to date, to move 
the farmers off the mountainside altogether. However, this is a complex set of relationships, 
and there is a contested politics of resource control among the range of interest groups that 
is involved in these conflicts. There is not a simple battle between the (private) farmers and 
the (public) state institutions. Instead the case involves a diversity of competing 
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interpretations of what is and what isn’t behind water shortages, and what constitutes the 
‘public interest’. This involves a limited number of ‘facts’ and quite a lot of positioning.
The private actors using water from the Ulugurus above Morogoro are not only the small-
scale farmers, but also the residential dwellings being built on the lower slopes as Morogoro 
expands. The public institutions with an interest in the water are not only those supplying 
water to urban Morogoro, but also the large public universities and Mzinga Army Base which 
are also heavy water consumers. Mzinga Army Base has its own large-scale irrigated agri-
cultural holding for rice production. Hence, we see a range of public and private interests 
enmeshed in the political ecology of irrigation practice of the small farmers in Choma.
Public and private in Tanzanian agricultural development
The two cases discussed above illustrate many of the complexities of public and private 
attributions outlined in the introduction. To make more sense of them, they need to be 
situated in the broader discourses and challenges shaping the contemporary Tanzanian 
agricultural state, which has long embodied a tension between aspirations towards a ‘mod-
ernised’ and growing agricultural sector and the apparent difficulty in achieving this. This in 
turn builds on the complex legacies of ujamaa and the villagisation programme of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which include a continuance of forced resettlement and localised dissent from 
state control.40
Over the last 10 years, there has been impressive economic growth, but not, however, in 
the agricultural sector. In the period 2005–2012, the Tanzanian economy grew at an average 
of around 6.9% per year, but this expansion was heavily weighted towards mining, tourism 
and telecommunications. Agricultural growth was estimated to be only around 4% per year 
over the same period.41 Poverty has remained entrenched, particularly in rural areas, and 
the vast majority of the population still derive most or all of their livelihood from agriculture. 
These contemporary statistics need to be set in the context of a long history of hope for 
‘modernisation’, development and considerable state intervention.
During colonialism, the German and British administrations invested in plantations of 
crops such as sisal and groundnuts, with a catastrophic failure in the latter.42 As has been 
well documented, the first independent Tanzanian government (initially supported by the 
World Bank) then drew on the Chinese experience to develop policies of ‘villagisation’, includ-
ing collectivisation and social organisation at the village level. These actions have been 
variously viewed as disastrous and well intentioned in design but misguided in execution.43 
Several large state-led irrigation schemes were constructed through aid from donors such 
as North Korea to be run by the government as state farms. However, such schemes never 
operated at full capacity and were mostly bankrupt and abandoned by the state by the 
mid-1990s.44 Greco’s analysis of class differentiation and accumulation illustrates the dynam-
ics of private interests in the period following the collapse of large-scale schemes and has 
several similarities with our observations from Dakawa,45 as powerful individuals and inter-
ests use their interactions with the state to advance their interests, for example in gaining 
access to and control of irrigated land.
A vision of agricultural modernisation is also at the foundation of current Tanzanian agri-
cultural policy, just as it was in earlier years. For example, the 1999 Tanzanian Development 
Vision 2025 aims to transform the country ‘from a low productivity agricultural economy to 
a semi-industrialised one, led by modernised and highly productive agricultural activities’.46 
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The structural economic transformation that will deliver Tanzania to this vision of the future 
relies on the transformation of agriculture from peasant subsistence farming to commer-
cialised, export-producing agribusinesses, and a gradual transition to a greater share of 
economic activity in manufacturing and services.47
The 2006 Agricultural Sector Development Programme and Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture 
First) policy of 2009 emphasise the need to commercialise agricultural production. 
Commercialisation is assumed to rely on the formalisation of individual property rights as 
a means to access credit for agricultural investment48 It also requires a significant expansion 
in irrigation. This vision of agricultural transformation is strongly shaped by development 
partners, notably USAID through Feed the Future, and with The United Kingdom Department 
for International Development (DFID)  and other partners through the Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) initiative (2010). Feed the Future prioritises enabling increases 
in agricultural productivity; SACGOT emphasises a commercial agribusiness–outgrower 
configuration. Again, irrigation development is a critical component of both programmes.49 
A lack of government resources and private-sector involvement is identified as the key reason 
why this high level of irrigation potential has never been achieved.
The 2010 National Irrigation Policy (NIP) emphasises specific types and forms of manage-
ment of irrigation. The policy suggests that: ‘Traditional’ irrigation has ‘informal, weak and 
inefficient irrigators organisations, inadequate skills on operation and maintenance resulting 
in low water use efficiency…’.50 The NIP aims to support the improvement of these schemes 
in both infrastructure and management. This is to be done through private-sector, NGO and 
faith-based organisation (FBO) participation. All traditional irrigation thus needs to be 
‘improved’. Improved traditional irrigation is ‘schemes originally initiated and operated by 
smallholder farmers that have received interventions by an external agency in the form of 
construction’.51 The NIP does not commit to fund such schemes but seeks investment from 
the private sector and/or ‘progressive’ smallholder farmers.
Meanwhile new schemes with an important role for commercial interests will be impor-
tant. However, here, smallholders’ interests are not seen as ‘commercial’ and therefore are 
not private interests. Within the NIP, the category of ‘private and commercial’ does not include 
smallholder farmers. It initially opens the possibility for ‘demand-driven irrigation scheme 
identification’ for smallholders but goes on to say (contrary to our evidence from Choma) 
that: ‘Although farmers may demand development of their irrigation scheme they lack irri-
gation skills, and therefore, will require substantial training in the overall development, 
operation and management techniques’.52 There is also an emphasis on the fact that farmers 
need to know how to pay fees for their water use. On the other hand, commercial investors 
are characterised as needing government support in order to acquire land, water-use permits 
and finance. Efficiency and management arrangements under commercial providers are not 
mentioned, other than the need to ensure that ‘water resources are available to commercial 
schemes’.53 Thus, whereas the private commercial investor is to be encouraged with a facil-
itating environment, the smallholder is to be educated to pay fees and improve their 
efficiency.
Following the 2010 NIP, the 2013 National Irrigation Act was created to give legislative 
push to the aims of the policy. The Act states that of the 29.4 million hectares of land con-
sidered suitable for irrigation, only around 500,000 hectares are under irrigation.54 Coulson 
has argued that data on land that is ‘suitable’ for irrigation are often highly unreliable, being 
based primarily on topographic and hydrological conditions, rather than on current usages 
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and rules of access to land. Nonetheless, the act allows provision for the acquisition of land 
by external investors for the purposes of irrigation investment. The National Irrigation 
Commission (NIC) was established through this act to facilitate the development of ‘thou-
sands’ of new irrigation schemes.
For the NIC, PPP is the preferred mechanism through which Tanzania can exploit its latent 
irrigation potential. For example, at a workshop bringing together researchers and the NIC 
in Dar es Salaam in 2016,55 the NIC emphasised the need to accelerate investment in irrigation 
from public and private funds.56 The primary challenge for the NIC is one of how to attract 
large-scale, foreign investors, and it focuses on providing a suitable facilitating environment 
for this to occur. This entails the building of infrastructure such as schemes, which are then 
to be run by the NIC or handed over to operators. In this context, PPPs are conceived of in 
terms of this primary relationship between state and investor, which excludes possible 
smaller scale or local investors.
The NIC, however, suffers from a limited capacity to achieve its objectives, and funding 
is a particular concern. In the 2015/2016 financial year, it received only 9.6% of its requested 
budget allocation.57 This echoes evidence found more widely in the water sector in Tanzania, 
where a lack of government investment in skills and capacity has led to a shortage of skilled 
personnel.58 The NIC reports that large commercial investors are reluctant to invest due to 
uncertainties over land ownership, bureaucracy and uncertain returns, and is therefore seek-
ing guidance on how to attract such investors.59
The workshop discussions also highlight challenges for irrigation development as a whole. 
Despite the overarching discourses of unused potential, there is very little information on 
what water resources are actually available in many places, or on what land is suitable for 
irrigated agriculture, and little consideration of how to resolve competing demands for water. 
As one workshop participant commented: ‘We do have policies in place but we have no 
good idea of what water resources we have, and we are using them in a very unregulated 
way’. In theory, the 2009 Water Resources Management Act sets out a legislative framework 
for managing competing demands for water. In practice, resource and institutional limita-
tions mean that the act is not implemented.
Discussions with NIC personnel also suggest that there is resistance to the idea that a 
small-scale farmer can also be an investor, or that they are already actively investing. In this, 
farmers are characterised as private, but not in the sense of ‘entrepreneurs’ as favoured in 
much of the development discourse discussed above: ‘These small-scale farmers are citizens 
(wananchi), not investors’.60  As our examples above demonstrated, it is, however, the case 
that private interests operate at multiple scales and levels, and further that there is great 
diversity in engagement with the public.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we have critiqued the dominant dichotomous view of the public and the private 
in irrigation development. In particular, we have been critical of the celebration of the ‘private’ 
that informs much contemporary discourse and which often diverts attention from the 
politics of resource control. We argued that an emphasis on both private entrepreneurs and 
public–private partnerships serves to obscure competition over resources and the exercise 
of power. It also over-simplifies the complexity in the relationships between public and 
private interests in irrigation, and supports arguments for the securing of private property 
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rights. When it comes to the ‘New Green Revolution’, we raised the question of whose inter-
ests are met in the ‘private sector’ that is at its centre.
Our evidence from Tanzania shows that the national body charged with developing irri-
gation tends to conceive of the ‘private’ as large, often foreign capital, which will enter into 
lucrative PPP arrangements. This in turn reflects the particular constraints that it is under, 
most notably in terms of central funding, in which a requested budget is funded at much 
less than what is required. For the NIC, the ‘private’ sector is certainly not the smaller, less-reg-
ulated irrigation practices that we found in Choma. This positioning of PPP as a model for 
attracting large-scale investment then obscures the range of potential relationships between 
the public and private interests in water. Water resources management more widely has 
struggled to resolve tensions between economic and social imperatives for water.61 Formal 
emphasis on PPP (defined primarily as a relationship between the nation-state and large 
corporate entity/ies)  misses critical aspects of the politics of water scarcity and claims on 
water resources.
Our two cases from Dakawa and Choma also reveal a more complex situation than a 
simple equation of the private with big business. In Dakawa, earlier public failure is now 
being reinvented as private success, as farmers are presented as coming together as entre-
preneurial individuals, albeit ones whose activities are couched in collective terms. But in 
fact, the state is still an important player, not least through its role in the Chollima Research 
Station, and hence in its management of the scheme. The dependency of the scheme on 
large quantities of aid also belies its portrayal as a beacon of independent entrepreneurialism. 
Even within this, the variety of farmers within the scheme (from the genuinely ‘small’, in terms 
of asset base and size of landholding, to those who are more accurately investors rather than 
farmers, and are closely linked to the state and politicians) demonstrates how complex the 
relationship between public and private really is.
Conversely, in Choma, we found considerable contestation around the activities of the 
irrigation entrepreneurs on the slopes of the mountains. This contestation was centred on 
the question of control over resources and the rights and wrongs of regulation. Here, com-
peting narratives – of environmental degradation versus those of unfair directives and unjus-
tified controls – show how politicised the opposition between state and private can be. In 
both cases, the private irrigation that is to be at the centre of Tanzania’s new Green Revolution 
both is not necessarily equitable in its results and, importantly, cannot be neatly separated 
from the public. It needs to be regulated, and responsibility for that regulation invariably 
falls to the state, however poorly equipped it is to do this.
Clearly, these findings support the wider argument that at the root of debates over public 
and private responsibility for irrigation are fundamental issues concerning control over scarce 
resources.62 These resources include land, but also water, which is of increasing significance.63 
In Tanzania, the answer to this from the state has been a formalisation of resource control 
through the creation of a system of permits and water users’ associations that paradoxically 
both maintain state control and are subverted at the local level.64 All of this matters because 
the effects of such positioning are often felt most strongly by those least able to influence 
the discourse.
We conclude, therefore, that rather than argue for or against the ‘private’ or the ‘public’ 
as abstract and generally apolitical entities, we need to interrogate the continuum between 
them and how this is embedded in politics that operate at a range of different scales. We 
concur with Clement’s argument that this necessitates a multi-level approach across 
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institutional levels, combined with analysis of power. 65 In the case of a resource such as 
water, the control of which takes place at local, national and international scales, this is 
particularly important. Hydrological entities such as watersheds and river basins are not 
value-free in the ways in which they are delineated and constructed, but focusing on either 
public or private can obscure these politics.66 Much discussion of the public and private in 
irrigation development, and the control over water that this entails, remains based in nar-
ratives that are more managerial and technical than anything else.67 We hope this contribu-
tion goes some way towards correcting this tendency.
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